OKON EDET UYA: THE PHILOSOPHER OF HISTORY by Irom, Obar Ayami
Irom, Obar Ayami “OKON EDET UYA: THE PHILOSOPHER OF 
HISTORY” in David Imbua, Stella Effa Attoe, Christopher B.N. Ogbogbo and 
Yakubu Ochefu (eds) Okon Edet Uya at 70: Issues in Historiography, Nation 
Building and the African Diaspora, Makudi: Aboki Publishers, 2016, pp 206-
226. ISBN 978-978-8512-39-4 
 
INTRODUCTION 
An introduction to Professor Uya’s philosophy of history class starts with this caution, 
‘as a historian, you must learn to think’. Put differently, you must learn to develop a critical 
mind for healthy scepticism. If Philosophy, is having second thought, that is thinking about 
the nature of some form of human thought and the implications of some body of human 
knowledge in the most ultimate and far-reaching way, then Professor Uya’s introductory 
remarks to his students of philosophy of history is not out of place. Historical judgements can 
be made by any student through careful and critical reading of the work of modern historians 
and by paying some attention to the biography, social and intellectual milieu of the author of 
the book he is reading. The author’s life and background will indicate his experiences and the 
ideas upon which he will draw in his facts and make inference. As a distinct historical field, 
historiography implies a systematic study of the way the historian does his work. It involves 
four different but closely related historical activities. The first is the reflection on the trends 
and patterns of historical writing and a systematic study of all the important historians; the 
second, is the discovery of critical analysis of historical sources; the third, is the construction 
and description of the past on the basis of the facts acquired; the fourth is the construction on 
the basis of the ascertain facts, of some general theory which gives meaning and inner logic 
to the known past.1 It  is useful for students because it will allow the student to see the whole 
sweep of historical literature and the changing assumptions and values that govern historical 
judgements in the modern world. Conscientious reading, research and writing which 
professor Uya puts his student through has not only given them this broad knowledge, of 
major historical trends, the course as taught by him, has undoubtedly expedited the gaining of 
this insight and understanding.   
 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: AN OVERVIEW 
 Two issues have dominated philosophy of history. Firstly, the argument about 
perspectives  which is made up of the studies of the development of history as an academic 
discipline over time, as well as its development in different culture and epochs. Perspectives 
here can either be outside-in or inside-out approaches.2 Secondly, the study of the academic 
tools, methods and approaches that have been and are being used in the study otherwise 
known as the methodology in historical writing.   
  As was the case with most forms of thoughts, the great turning point in philosophy of 
history came at the end of the nineteenth century. Until that time, philosophers had always 
been concerned with the nature of the historical process. They presented various doctrines to 
account for the inner reality of history, the inner force that caused the development of the 
historical process. From the fourth to the eighteenth century, it was widely believed that 
divine providence moved history. With advocates like St. Augustine in his The City of God, 
he laid down the law of divine providence.  He stated that history was a response to divine 
providence; hence, there was a purpose in history.  History to St. Augustine led to divine 
blessedness-a society at peace with itself. It was a deviation from this purpose that resulted in 
disaster. Professor Uya exemplifies St. Augustine ideas in the motives that propelled the 
European colonization of Africa under three Cs’- Christianity, Commerce and Civilization. 
At this time, Europe saw itself as Christian Europe bringing Christianity, civilization and 
development to Africa. 
 The Italian School of Philosophy represented by Giambatista Vico’s New Science 
(1725-1744)  Emmanuel Kant in his contribution in the periodical Berlin Monthly, in 
November 1784, under the title ‘Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of 
View’, advocated a spiral view of history and they identified three stages in the historical 
development of mankind. The age of the gods, this was the period when the gods decided in 
history; the age of heroes, the period when history was linked to great men and heroes; and 
the age of men. In all three, we see the ideas of divine providence running through. The 
Greek and Roman philosophers believed that history moved in cyclical or ever recurring 
cycle patterns and that a process of growth and decay was the ultimate historical reality. 
The early nineteenth century German thinker, G.W.F.Hegel, certainly the most 
influential philosopher of history of the past 200 years, found an objective causal reality 
inside the process of history itself. A ‘spirit’ that moved forward to the present in a dialectical 
pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Like Emmanuel Kant before him, he advocated the 
theory of change and development in the society which came largely as a result of mans 
struggle to preserve his autonomy in the society.  Hegel thought that society cannot develop 
without struggle and his ideas are known as the Hegelian Dialectics. Karl Marx and Frederich 
Engels entered the scene and combined Hegel’s dialectical reality to economic determinism 
to arrive at the conclusion that the thrust of the inevitable class struggle was the reality within 
the historical process. Instead of talking about groups in the society as Hegel did, Marx and 
Engels extended and said the most important issue that people struggle over is economic 
issue or control over the source of production, and in the pre-industrial age, land was the 
issue. They further divided the society into classes. The owners of land were the aristocrat, 
the middle class were the bourgeois and the landless class were the peasants. They therefore 
postulated the law known as historical materialism or economic determinism.  Since for 
them, the dialectic approach was the best way to study and understand history. Marx was also 
famous for postulating the idea that history is a weapon for revolution. Thus, well into the 
later part of the nineteenth century, philosophy assumed the real nature of an objective 
history and philosophers of history concerned themselves largely with creating a historical 
metaphysics. They portrayed in various ways the historical reality that was assumed to exist 
outside the minds of the historical observers and beneath the surface of facts and to impel 
history forward to a goal of glory or damnation. 
Between the 1920’s and the 1960’s, the dominant issue in historiography amongst 
philosophers and philosophers of history was why there was nothing fixed in history. The 
question was initially posed in terms of whether or not history is a science or an art? If history 
was a science, then it shared some of the properties of science like accuracy and factuality, 
probability, replication and independence of cultural, environmental and other factors. For the 
advocates of history as science therefore, the central question was of factuality. Can history 
be factually written? Is a historical fact, fact indeed? Can it be proven? Can there be an 
absolute historical truth rather than the relative and approximate facts as we have it. One of 
the best scholars who became known as the father of scientific or historical objectivity was 
Leopold Van Ranke, who along with his students propagated the Rankean idea of objectivity 
in history and by the 1960’s, it became known as the Rankean School of Objectivity. His 
ideas were hinged on two important assumptions.  Firstly, there are facts in history that 
cannot be disputed and a good example is the Nigerian civil war; Secondly, that the historian 
should recover the facts as they are. Ranke saw the historian as being neutral hence the 
caution that historians be past minded and not present minded in their approach to 
reconstructing history. The Rankean school presupposed that the past can be replicated in its 
fullness and accuracies. 
To Ranke’s assumptions, Professor Uya argues, using the Nigerian civil war as an 
example that, the forces that culminated in the war did not start in 1967, so how useful is the 
fact of the civil war? This brings the distinction between facts, useable facts and historical 
facts which are useable to the fore. To the second assumption, Professor Uya ask, can the 
historian be neutral in the asking of the why question, and why do two or more historians, ask 
the same questions but come out with different answers? The historian in Professor Uya’s 
thinking cannot be neutral because he is a product of his society, culture, environment and 
training. There is also the issue of the historical documents which are not a product of 
objective conditions. They are either incomplete, inaccessible or bias which affects the 
objectivity of the history written.3 
By the end of the nineteenth century, a new doubt set in as to the ability of the human 
mind to get outside of itself and to focus upon a final and causal reality that stood over and 
against individual minds. This relativism shattered the central place metaphysics had held for 
a century in philosophical thinking and directed philosophers to concern themselves with 
epistemological problems with whether and how the human mind can know anything outside 
of itself. This general shift on western thought had a profound effect upon the philosophy of 
history.  Process and causation could no longer be regarded as implicit in an objectified 
history itself. Rather, they were part of the historians own thinking, part of the decision- 
making process that led him to make judgements about history. Historical process was not an 
objectified reality. It was the act of thinking and writing itself. Historians did not discover 
history, they created it.  Far from standing at the climatic point of history from which he 
could loftily look downwards to survey and explain what was happening outside of himself, 
the historian now found himself alone, recognizing that it was the synthetic power of his 
mind that created an integrated and meaningful historical process out of the endless confusion 
of the past. The historians own values were seen to be the measure of truth that was used 
making historical judgements about the past. 
The above analysis has so far shown how various philosophers of history presented 
various doctrines to account for the inner reality of history, the inner forces that caused the 
development of the historical process. History was regarded as an objective thing, existing 
outside the mind of the historian. The only problem was to identify the cause that moved this 
historical process. Process here was regarded as intrinsic in history and no attention was paid 
to the historian himself, who was simply held to recognize and describe the inner reality that 
produced historical change. They argued that general laws or covering laws governed 
historical developments everywhere. These laws were also known as speculative construction 
of history. Elements of speculative history included the tendency to regard historical 
developments as a series of general ordered events and patterns which occur and repeat 
themselves in all stages of human development. In other words, nothing is new under the sun 
as history will always repeat itself. This tendency it must be noted denied uniqueness to any 
historical event,  as for example, the idea of the universality of man was imposed;  . Man 
everywhere was seen as the same. Hence, human history was about mans fight to conquer. 
But we all know that over time, man fights war for other reasons apart from wants. It could 
be for honour, liberation etc.; the idea that every area of the globe will replicate the 
development of Europe in almost every stage of their historical development. In this way, 
Europe becomes the model for all countries to follow4. 
To the speculative historians, Professor Uya has this to say, ‘for a perspective to be 
meaningful, it must reflect the following: a firm knowledge of the language and culture of the 
society; empathy and not sympathy with the culture; and finally, it must view the society 
from the inside-out rather than the outside-in approach.5 
The earlier and older philosophers of history could take the existence of facts for 
granted. For Hegel and Marx, history witnessed the operation of real tangible facts. They had 
no doubts that the historian could discover the reality in the historical process. Twentieth 
century relativism however, believes that each historian selects and criticizes according to his 
personal values. Therefore, the modern philosophy of history has had to cope with the new 
and unfamiliar question ‘what is a fact?’, epistemology, rather than metaphysics, has been the 
central focus of the philosophy of history since 1900. 
These fundamental changes in the focus and doctrine of the philosophy of history 
were effected by late nineteenth and early twentieth century by the philosophers of the ‘Neo-
Hegelian’ school. It is true that the eighteenth century Italian philosopher Vico had already 
claimed that historical knowledge was heavily dependent on the historians imaginative 
inventions. But Vico’s original theories went unheralded, until Hegel’s’ more radical 
followers noticed a basic paradox and tension in Hegelian theory and by examining it closely, 
set the modern philosophy of history on the road to epistemological relativism. Hegel 
observed that history is ‘the progress of consciousness of freedom’,6 that is, the historical 
process is an intellectual structure, a refined idea of the past, giving it meaning and unity. 
Hegel had assumed that in constructing this historical image, the individual historian or 
philosopher mind was reflecting an absolute intelligence in the universe. But if this last 
assumption is held to be doubtful, or untenable, we are left not with an historical process 
controlled by an objective ‘real’ universal idea, but a process created by the insights of 
individual human minds. 
This relativist allowed the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey in the 1880’s to 
stress the importance of the historians own ‘experience’ for  understanding the experiences of 
people in the past.7 It led the Italian thinker Benedetto Croce in the second decades of the 
twentieth century to claim that the past is part of an ‘eternal present’ and  history exist in the 
present thoughts of the historian and not in some already existing objective past.8 It allowed 
the English philosopher of history B. G. Collingwood, in the third decades of the twentieth 
century to note that ‘history is wholly a reasoned knowledge of what is transient and 
concrete....The historians picture of his subject, whether that subject be a sequence of events 
or past state of things, appears as a web of imaginative construction stretched between certain 
fixed points provided by the statements of the authorities’. He viewed history as a product of 
the historians ‘imaginative construction’.9 And it also led the German philosopher Ernst 
Cassirer who sought  refuge from Hitler in America to stress the way in which our 
understanding of the past is shaped by the connotative ‘myths’ or ‘symbolic forms’1o in the 
period between 1930-1945. 
By the 1930’s, the trend to epistemological relativism had reached extreme 
proportions. The distinguished American historian Carl Becker and Charles Beard were so 
impressed by the theories of the neo-Hegelian school that Charles Beard argued that 
historical objectivity was desirable but not practicable. He concluded that historical 
objectivity ‘is a mirage’ or ‘a noble dream’11. One reason for this expression was the nature 
of history itself as captured by the goddess of history ‘CLOE’. The joy was the pursuit of 
objectivity, but not getting it. Carl Becker added another angle to the debate when he argued 
that ‘every man was his own historian, and that writing history was the simple act of faith’12. 
Since the late 1930’s, there has however, been a withdrawal from the extreme view 
that history is simply a branch of private myth and has nothing whatsoever to do with an 
objective or universal truth. The terrible consequences’ of the historical fantasies propounded 
by the Nazi and communist propaganda have made Western philosophers to carefully 
reconsider whether the historian does not after all follow some general rules of rational 
thinking, parallel to the kind of universal reasoning used in the natural science. The American 
philosophers Carl Hempel and Ernest Nagel find a middle ground between old fashioned 
belief in the absolute truth of history and the recent extreme relativism. They believe that 
historical analysis does follow ‘probabilistic’ rules about human conduct. Hear Carl Hempel, 
‘historical explanation, too, aims at showing that the event in question was not a matter of 
chance but was to be expected in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions. The 
expectation referred to is not prophecy or divination, but rational scientific anticipation which 
rests on the assumption of general laws’13.  For example, the assumptions that people who 
have jobs do not like to lose them, and that the historian employs a reasonable process of 
explanation and logic. Consequently, the philosopher is able to place historical thinking in the 
category of empherical science. Some professional historian would subscribe to a middle 
ground view similar to the Hempel-Nagel epistemology. They would point out that:  
Granted that historians examining the same era of the past may have 
profound differences in interpretation, may see some very different 
patterns of cause and effect in the events they examine, they will still 
agree on many things. And as history has developed as a science in the 
past century, historians have arrived at many common conclusions on the 
interpretation of the past, while still disagreeing on others. There is, 
therefore, a universe of discourse among historians, a hard substratum of 
commonly agreed-on truth about the past as well as a continuing debate 
on other aspects of the past upon which agreement may and probably 
will be reached eventually.14  
This current middle –ground belief in a universe of historical discourse does not 
preclude the tremendous impact of neo-Hegelian relativism, not only in the modern 
philosophy of history but also in the actual work of historians.  Causation is no longer seen as 
a fixed objective theory outside the historian mind. Causation or historical explanation seeks 
to make intelligible the connections between  what is to be explained or the ’explanandum’, 
for example the Nigerian civil war and the set of variables that are said to explain it, or the 
intrinsic factors called the ‘explanands’. Causation is now widely regarded as the explanation 
of the relationship between the details obtained from the primary sources. Today, historians 
seldom ask of a major interpretation:  ‘is it true’, rather, they ask whether a particular 
statement of causation is ‘significant’ and ‘valid’. Because of the impact of epistemological 
relativism, historical truth is now seen to be probabilistic rather than absolute. 
HISTORICISM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFRICAN HISTORY    
The precipitous twentieth century decline of the belief in the objective historical 
reality raised disturbing and fundamental questions on the ethical side of the philosophy of 
history. Whether it is valid to exercise a moral judgement on the conduct of man in the past 
has probably been a more difficult and pressing issue for the practicing historian than the 
paradox of epistemological relativism. The moral problem can be stated simply: the historian 
it is held, does not discover an external reality but in a sense creates one by the synthetic 
power of his mind. But how can he then make moral judgements about people in the past that 
he is describing? If the historian does not discover an objectified reality, how can he presume 
to judge past ages by an objective standard of moral values? 
These are not easy questions to answer, and the rise of epistemological relativism at 
the beginning of the twentieth century encouraged the extreme moral relativism of German 
historians in the 1920s’ and 1930s’. The doctrine of ‘historicism’ excluded the historian from 
making ethical judgements about individual or collective human conduct. The reaction 
against moral relativism in the writing of history during the past three decades began with 
emotional recoil against Nazi atrocities. The effect has been the predication of a kind of law- 
of nature doctrine of moral judgement in history.  If past conducts transgressed universal 
feelings that certain acts such as mass murder, the ruthless exploitation of people through 
slave trade, colonization are reprehensible, then the historian has a right and a duty to 
discriminate between ethical light and darkness.     
Historicism is the word that came into popular usage from the 1930s’ but applied with 
great virulence to writings by African historians between 1960s and 1980s’. Historicism 
implied the impact of the ‘climate of opinion’ on scholarship. To Christopher Nwodo, 
historicism means that the historian, in order to study the past, must empathize with the past. 
Besides understanding and feeling his way into the lives of the peoples under investigation, 
the historian must accept their view.15 Professor Uya has mentioned some factors that impede 
on objectivity and led to historicism. They include the prevailing perspectives of the time in 
which the historian is living; changing methodology; prevailing morality/norms and values of 
the time; prevailing ideologies; nationalism; racism/ethnic chauvinism; sexism/gender; class 
and audience/clientele.16 As will be shown, historicism affects the reconstruction of history 
be it in Europe, Africa or any where else on the globe.   
One peculiar thing in the writing of history is that every generation challenges the 
conventional interpretation of the generation before it. This is so because as each generation 
ask the why question, especially, as new evidences or methodologies for the reinterpretation 
emerges. Initially, these were the two main accepted reasons for  re-interpretation in history. 
But increasingly, it has been shown that concerns beyond those of new evidence and methods 
have shaped the quest for re-interpretation in history.  The challenges of the times which 
question the purpose and the meaning of history have caused historians overtime to re-
interpret the relevant or useable past. Most times these challenges are political, cultural, 
economic and nation building. The attempts at re-interpretation are always influenced by the 
‘climate of opinion of the time’ in which the historian lives in.   
Until the 1950’s, historians, who held sway in the study of history, like G. W. Hegel 
in the nineteenth century, A.P. Newton in 1923 and Hugh Trevor-Roper in 1963, to mention 
but a few, held firmly that Africa was no part of history, hence it had no history of its own 
before the coming of the Europeans. The only history Africa had was that of European 
activities in the continent. This assertion was influenced by the Euro-centric perspective, 
otherwise known as the ‘Covering Law Theory’ or The Hampel-Popper Law,  made popular 
by Carl Hempel and Karl Popper, 17   and the over dependence on written sources as the only 
acceptable  method for the reconstruction of history.  For the European scholars, the general 
belief at that time was that ‘history began when man took to writing’, so African history 
which was not written was a source of confusion to them. On written documents, Edward 
Hallet Carr has noted that:  “No document can tell us more than what the author of the 
document thought-what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would 
happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he 
himself thought he thought”.18 What happened to Africa was a case of unjustified denigration 
of a people and their past  by certain western scholars who did not only create an erroneous 
world opinion that the African continent had not made any meaningful contribution to 
civilization because her people are backward and low in intelligence and culture.19 it still did 
not justify the denying of Africa a future which remained an open possibility.     
The earliest attempt at the explanation of the historical development of Africa was 
made by Muslim scholars whose activities began to impinge in African societies during the 
golden age of Arab expansion. Like all imperialist, they claimed that the world was created 
around their homeland.  With this confidence, they armed themselves with a monotheistic 
religious ideology, and assumed that light and civilization spread from the land of their birth 
to other parts of the world.20 The propagation of this idea of the Arabs as the dominant 
historical cause agent in African history laid the foundation for the use, of race as the primary 
causative factor in history into the nineteenth century when the Europeans undertook the 
penetration of Africa interior. In the words of Dr Robert Knox: “Race is everything: 
literature, science, art- in a word, civilization depends on it.”21 Armed with this view, Europe 
gave the idea propagated by the Arabs further refinement in claiming that wherever their 
influence was not felt ‘darkness reigned’. The manner in which these scholars perceived 
Africa historically, reflects the level to which they had fallen into their trap of historicism.  
Phillip Curtin has observed that “Western historical tradition until recently was 
thoroughly ethnocentric and ill adapted to the investigation of other societies....”22 This was 
so because European historiography of the time, the state and political history occupied the 
centre of the stage, thanks to the lingering effects of the French revolution, and of Leopold 
Von Ranke and his school for whom the state was the embodiment of the divine idea in 
history. Understandably, therefore, the European authors who took an interest in the African 
past had their gaze focused on the same theme. At times, so anxious were they to find states 
in the African past that they ended up creating them on paper. A classic case was that of Lord 
Palmer, who created an empire of ancient Kwararafa in Nigerian history, a state which to the 
present day historians and archaeologists are trying to create.23 These explains why the early 
African historians dealt mainly with political developments. But the peculiar nature of 
African society, where political developments occur in society and economic developments 
shape political developments, the challenge of neutrality or of writing scientific history 
became difficult. 
          If Africa had no past, how was it possible therefore to reconstruct the history of 
no history? What then is history that Africans did not have? History means different things to 
different people and at different periods, hence, the definition can be idealist, empiricist or 
materialist. To the idealist, the ‘idea’ is what is real; it is the moving force of history, while 
experience is merely the representation. Empiricist focus on empirical instances as the 
essence of history. Materialist believe historical processes are rooted in material reality, from 
which they abstract theoretical propositions.24  Each definition implies a philosophical 
commitment, ideological orientation whether or not it is consciously articulated, for it rest on 
existing concepts, beliefs and values derived from complex social practises and relations, 
shared memories and cultural imagination. Many historians would agree that history is not 
simply a representation of the past as it is in the Rankean tradition but in this context,   
“History involves consciously bringing the human mind or intellect to work according to 
certain prescribed rules and usages on the remains of the past, with a view to reconstructing 
the story of what happened, and perhaps also drawing certain conclusions there from, for the 
education or entertainment or both of the contemporaries of the historian.”25 from the 
definition above, it is possible to entertain certain ideas and conception about the past without 
actually being, writing or practicing historiography. This is truer for the African situation 
where every work that uses information or makes references to the African past was seen as a 
work of history.   
How was the African to handle the challenge of an inherited image? The first 
challenge for the Africa historian was to show that there was an African history long before 
the Europeans came along, and that African history was not just the history of European 
activities in Africa. Rather in the words of Professor Ade-Ajayi, European presence was an 
episode in the continuing historical process that was on going in Africa26. It had to be 
established that African history must be consciously written from the inside-out approach as 
this centred o the Africans and Africa, rather than from the outside-in approached that had 
prevailed before the 1950’s. For African history is not simply the introduction of African 
materials into the discussion of the experiences, the expansion and achievement of a 
civilization whose soul and centre lie outside the African continent, no matter how such a 
civilization may have impinged on, or impacted upon some portion of Africa, or on some 
groups of Africa.27   
This attempt to show that Africa had a history led to the emergence of a new 
methodology of oral tradition in the reconstruction of African past.  Being a pre-literate 
society at that time, oral traditions which is defined as ‘all verbal testimonies which are 
reported statement concerning the past’28, helped to show that Africans were cultural 
protagonist, the creators of their own fortunes who played an important role in shaping the 
fortunes of their society. African historians were accused as being historicist because their 
works were not driven by the normal concerns of historians which is objectivity, but by 
considerations such as cultural, nationalism, political, nation building etc which challenged 
history to serve relevant and useful ends .The study of African history is unique since it 
cannot be studied without adopting a holistic approach, as it showed a “coherence or 
compatibility among all disciplines- philosophy, theology, medicine, politics, social theory, 
land and these find themselves logically concatenated in a system so tight that to subtract one 
item from the whole was to destroy the structure of the whole”29 The outcome has been the 
inclusion of inter-disciplinary approach as a method in the study of African history.          
This challenge of an inherited image which was not the historiography of Africa, 
helped to give birth to a true African historiography as it brought to the study of African 
history a subject matter, purpose, philosophy and its method. This was achieved through the 
vigorous documentation of Africa, and led to the autonomy of African historical 
reconstruction laying more emphasis on the inside-out approach as against the previous 
outside-in approach. On this point Thomas Hodgkin observed in 1961 that “ it is clear the 
study of African history is only beginning to develop its proper method of inquiry, its critical 
standard and the authority that is the consequence of these”30. 
This autonomy has helped to emphasize the relevance of historical studies to the 
dilemma of nation building for example in Africa. The challenge raised questions in the area 
of epistemology, which is the use of knowledge. Do we acquire knowledge for the sake of it 
or do we acquire knowledge to assist us cope with and solve the problems of existence in our 
time? Since our work must provide a solution to the concrete problems of our time, historical 
scholarship must be an ally in the forging of national consciousness especially that of nation 
building in Africa which is believed to be impossible because of the ethnic factor. The 
emergence of inter-group studies which help to identify historical roots and historical 
contributions to the solving of the challenges of nation building is historicism, but it is a step 
in the right direction to make history relevant and useable. 
It is clear that despite the anbiquity inherent in historiography, its central doctrine is 
the idea of history as being non-determinable, open ended and depended on human decisions 
and choices,31 as the contemporary situation in the theory of history and culture in general is 
unintelligible without an appreciation of the meaning and the consequence of historicism.32 In 
other words, according to historicism, an element of contingency recurse in history      
CONCLUSION 
From the analysis, the problems raised by the philosophy as the case with any branch 
of philosophy may not indeed be soluble. Ones the student understands the terminologies and  
learns what the theorist are saying, the student it is hoped will know that on any issue 
philosophers of history debate, a plausible argument can be made for either side;  that the 
student of history is helped in his work by having an introductory knowledge of the main 
trends in the modern philosophy of history as this will help the student have a critical, 
restrained awareness of the problems raised by the philosophy of history in connection with 
reality, epistemology and values. This it is hoped will make the student a better historian 
because the student becomes conscious of all the theoretical implications of their work. It 
makes the student less naive and simple minded in their assumptions and more careful and 
self critical in their thinking and writing; that an acquaintance with philosophy of history 
helps the student to understand fully books written in the historical profession in which 
allusions are made to theories and theorist of the philosophy of history; the student has 
developed a taste for what is good history and what is not; and the student should have 
reached a level of expertise in the historians craft when after reading a book or listening to a 
lecture, can pretty well see the assumptions and values that are determining the historians 
structuring of the material. 
   Professor Uya has helped students by placing the heavy obligation upon the students 
to read and evaluate historical literature for themselves. Allowing them examine the 
historians for themselves has helped the students to gain understanding of the values and 
qualities of the influential historical thinkers whose works are used in the course. These 
introductory remarks in historiography and the philosophy of history as taught by Professor 
Okon Uya, it is hope, has made for a brief understanding of what the course entails, and has 
hopefully put an eagerness to embark on an abstract historical thinking. 
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